Sir John Macdonald took steps very quickly to carry out this provision. In 1869 he introduced a Supreme Court Bill which had been drafted for him by Mr. Justice S. H. Strong of Toronto who was later to become one of the original members of the supreme court when it was set up in 1875 and eventually to preside over it as chief justice. The 1869 bill was dropped on second reading. In the next year Macdonald brought in a revised bill which was also abandoned by the government. There was no secret as to why the government failed to push these bills. Their French-Canadian followers were opposed to a federal court of appeal which, they feared, would encroach upon Quebec's autonomy through its power to adjudicate upon legislation dealing with 1This article is based mainly upon Edward Blake's private papers which are deposited in the University of Toronto Library. Most of the Blake papers are stored in filing-cases, each case being numbered, with the documents inside each case also numbered. Foot-note references to these papers in this article give the number of the filing-case first, followed by the number of the document in the case. The Blake papers include also Edward Blake's private letter books during the period when he was minister of justice; there are ten of these letter books. 245 
those topics, especially property and civil rights, which by section 92 of the British North America Act had been assigned to the exclusive control of the provinces. This objection was felt also in certain English-Canadian circles. Members of the bench and bar in both Ontario and New Brunswick criticized, or expressed doubts about, Macdonald's bills on this same. ground of provincial rights; their views may be found to-day collected in the volume of the Macdonald papers in the Archives at Ottawa which contains his correspondence on the Supreme Court Bills, 1868-70. The most trenchant statement of the provincial rights case came from David Mills of Ontario. But Macdonald publicly confessed that it was the opposition of his French-Canadian followers which chiefly caused him to hesitate.
In the second session of 1873, however, the speech from the throne announced that the government proposed to proceed with a bill to establish a general court of appeal. On this occasion the announcement was probably in the nature of window-dressing, since the charges of the Pacific scandal were hanging over Macdonald. At any rate, he resigned too soon for any action to be taken. The Mackenzie government, fresh from its triumph in the 1874 election, also announced a bill for a general court of appeal in the speech from the throne of that year. But nothing was done in this session. Finally in February, 1875, Fournier, Mackenzie's minister of justice, introduced a bill which was carried through all its stages during the session and became law.
Fournier's bill was largely based upon those of Macdonald. The Liberal government agreed with Macdonald that parliament had under section 101 the power to set up a court of appeal which could pass upon provincial as well as federal legislation; and while the debates showed a good deal of opposition, again from English as well as from French spokesmen, on this point of provincial rights, the government had little difficulty in carrying through the main clauses of its measure. Macdonald, in fact, gave his assistance to Fournier in the discussions and divisions on the bill, so much so that the Montreal Gazette declared that it owed more to him than to the minister of justiceY 2Montreal Gazette, April :2, 18715. In later years, after the court was established, several attempts were made to destroy it. Macdonald and Blake usually joined hands on these occasions to defend the court. In 1880, in moving the six months' hoist to one of these wrecking bills, Blake paid this tribute to Macdonald's services in 18715: "[The Bill] received the most earnest support of the Hon. the First Minister, at that time leader of the Opposition; to one clause alone, introduced during the progress of the Bill, did he object; as to the rest, he facilitated the progress, and improved the machinery of the Bill as much as possible" (Canada, House of ½ornrnor•s debates, 1880, Feb. 9,6).
The other main point of controversy arising out of the bill concerned the question of appeal to the privy council. Fournier's draft, when introduced into the commons, contained no reference to this subject. 3 He himself declared that "while he did not desire to put any unnecessary obstacle in the way of exercising the right of petition, he wished to see the practice put an end to altogether ....
There were very strong reasons in favour of the right of appeal to the Privy Council, but the reasons against it were still stronger. The right of appeal had been rather extensively used, and he might add, considerably abused in the Province of Quebec, by wealthy men and wealthy corporations to force suitors to compromise in cases in which they had succeeded in all the tribunals of the country. However, he made no mention of the matter in the bill now before the House, but left it to be disposed of at some future time. "4 There was considerable discussion about the appeal. Various members pointed out that the practical effect of setting up a new court in Canada would be to lessen appeals to England; and it was noteworthy that the Rouge members on the government side gave their approval to this expected result. 5 Macdonald from the start expressed his opposition to any attempt to abolish the appeal. A private member, Irving of Hamilton, tried to get an amendment prohibiting the carrying of appeals from the provincial courts direct to the privy council and compelling all such appeals to come up to the new supreme court; but this was defeated. Finally, at the very last stage of the bill, on its third reading on March 30, Irving introduced another amendment dealing with the appeal. This was seconded by Laflamme of Montreal, one of the leading Rouge members, ø it was accepted by Fournier, and was passed as clause 47 of the bill. It ran as follows: "The judgment of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and no appeal shall be brought from any judgment or order of the Supreme Court to any Court of Appeal established by the Parliament of Great Britain and Ireland, by which appeals or petitions to Her Majesty in Council may be ordered to be heard, saving any right aMacdonald's 1870 bill had contained a clause expressly safeguarding the appeal. 4Canada, House of commons debates, 1875, Feb. 23. aSome of the Quebec Conservatives at least were momentarily hostile to the appeal because of the judgment of the privy council in the famous Guibord case. The Quebec courts at this time, to judge from letters in the Blake papers and from public discussion in the newspapers, were in a highly unsatisfactory condition. Many more appeals went from Quebec to the privy council than from any other province. 6Laflamme succeeded Blake as minister of justice in the Mackenzie cabinet in 1877. The bill went up to the senate where clause 47 also produced strong opposition. The senators, in fact, divided evenly, 29 to 29, and the clause was only carried by the speaker's casting vote.
Seventeen senators felt so strongly on the subject that they entered on the records a solemn protest. 8 Lord Dufferin, the governor-general, after discussing with his ministers whether he should reserve the bill, assented to it, and it became law as one of the acts of the 1875 session.
All the discussion in both houses took for granted that the effect of the clause would be what was clearly its intention, that is, to cut off ordinary appeals to the privy council. As Lord Cairns, the British lord chancellor, was later to point out, there seemed to be an assumption in Canada that there existed a distinction between an appeal to the sovereign in council as a species of prerogative remedy in peculiar cases (which was preserved by the proviso at the end of the clause) and an appeal in the regular course leading to a reference to the judicial committee (which Blake's first main responsibility on entering office was to arrange for the six appointments to the supreme court. that, while he would have preferred a settlement of the appeal question before any action setting up the court, he would now offer no objection to the act being brought into operation; and if the appeal clause should be decided by the English authorities to be unconstitutional, its amendment would obviate any necessity for disallowance, this being the only objection to the measure. •s Blake and Mackenzie agreed that the argument for the appeal clause should be presented in some formal written way to the colonial office, but at the same time so as to avoid any direct collision with the British authorities. They decided that Blake should draft a memorandum in the form of a private letter to Mackenzie, which Mackenzie would then forward to Carnarvon. Blake's memorandum, TM dated October 6, is a strong statement of the case that clause 47 only continued and extended a policy which provincial legislatures had carried out without objection before 1867 in strictly limiting appeals. "If it was competent to provincial authority, and is competent to Canada, to make the Judgment of Local Courts final in the vast majority of cases, it must surely be, by the same process of reasoning, within its competence to make that judgment final in all cases. Unless therefore it should be intended to reverse the settled current of Local Legislation, to assume a power which has never before been used in like case, and to withdraw by the exercise of executive authority the rights and liberties of Canada and the Provinces, conferred by the Imperial Parliament and established by the usage of so many years, it would seem to be impossible to disallow the Act in question."
It happened that Cartwright, the minister of finance, was in London on financial business at this moment. Blake's memorandum was sent to him also and he was instructed to argue the case with Lord Carnarvon as effectively as possible. He wrote back to Blake on November 5: "I had a conference yesterday with Lord Carnarvon as to the Supreme Court. He is favourable himself, but great difficulties are being raised by the Chancellor. •øIbid., 13: 169.
•7Ibid., 13: 121.
•SThis despatch, with its enclosures, is in the printed collection, Blake papers, 105: 8. Cannon (Canadian bar review, Oct., 1925) quotes from it and its enclosures extensively.
the question between the two governments was as much one of policy as one of law or constitutional right, he argued that the statesmanlike course was to inquire, not whether the Dominion legislature had or had not vested in it the power of terminating appeals to England, but whether it was expedient for the Dominion parliament, by its legislation, to bring such questions to an issue. While emphasizing that the imperial government was not yet expressing any final opinion, he enclosed two memoranda which had been drafted in answer to Blake's statement of October 6. One of these emanated from the privy council office and the other from Lord Cairns, the chancellor. The first took very high ground as to the prerogative character of the appeal and as to its great historic importance as a link of empire. Both documents pointed out that the part of clause 47 referring to a court set up by English legislation to which appeals might be transferred was now inoperative, since no such court had been set up nor was likely to be set up. Lord Cairns argued, therefore, that the whole clause was in effect inoperative, because all that it amounted to was a statement that the judgment of the supreme court should be final followed by a proviso saving the prerogative right of appeal to the privy council? Since, however, there had been so much discussion in Canada on the assumption that clause 47 would bar appeals, the despatch enclosed a suggested draft clause to be substituted for clause 47, which clearly preserved the appeal and went on to regulate it by limiting it to cases involving property of more than $5,000 in value.
To understand the wording of clause 47 and Blake's discussions of it, it is necessary to turn aside here for a moment and give a brief account of recent changes that had been taking place in the organization of the English courts. In 1871 the judicial committee of the privy council, which was badly in arrears with its work, was strengthened by the addition of four salaried judges. These members soon became in effect the judicial committee; and their labours had by 1876, according to Lord Cairns's statement on introducing his Appellate Jurisdiction Bill of that year, cleared away all arrears and made the court a thoroughly satisfactory body.
In 1873 Lord Selborne carried through his great Judicature Act which completely reorganized the whole English judicial The historic forms may have been preserved in 1876 partly to conciliate opposition from some of the colonies against carrying their appeals to a new, purely statutory, English court. But the public discussion in England during these years from 1873 to 1876 shows little evidence that this was a conscious motive. Certainly Cairns's method of settling the appeal question preserved in the judicial field the sentimental argument about the throne as a link of unity in the empire, which Selborne's method would have sacrificed. But English discussions in the two houses and in the editorials of The Times seem to be almost entirely concentrated upon the subject of the appeal in the United Kingdom; controversy centred about the house of lords as a judicial body. Englishmen apparently paid little attention to the appeal functions of the privy council, and took it for granted that, since the strengthening of the judicial committee in 1871, it was working to the satisfaction of everyone concerned. During the 1876 discussions, various members of both houses mentioned in passing how devoted the colonies were to the idea of an appeal to the foot of the throne, blissfully ignoring the fact that the minister of justice of the senior colony was in London at that very time vigorously protesting against the continuation of the appeal so far as Canada was concerned. For Cairns's Appellate Jurisdiction Bill was going through its later stages during June and July.
Blake was not able to sail for England until June 3, 1876.
*'øThe Times repeatedly pointed out that Cairns was in effect making a new court by his creation of the new lords of appeal, and only giving to the new court the old name of the house of lords. In its best sarcastic style it remarked (Feb. 26, 1876): "We must wonder at the magic of names, which appears as powerful to captivate legal as theological minds." But as soon as he could get any spare time from his routine duties he set himself in Ottawa to study the whole question of the appeal, collecting material about the early history of the prerogative courts in England, about the operation of the appeal in the American colonies before 1776, and about its operation in the colonies of the second empire after 1783. He got legal friends in Toronto and Montreal to prepare data for him on the costs of the appeal in Canadian cases, on the time taken before appeals were decided, on the number of appeals which were entered and never prosecuted to a conclusion. He discussed the question with other legal members of the Canadian ministry and with friends such as Chief-Justice Dorion of Quebec and David Mills. He drafted in a preliminary form another long memorandum on the subject, being mainly an answer to the two memoranda enclosed in Lord Carnarvon's despatch of March 9. 2• But the more he thought about the question, the more he was impressed by Lord Cairns's argument that clause 47 was in effect inoperative.
His doubts and difficulties can be seen in his correspondence with Mills. On May 3 he writes:
. . . In these arguments there seems to me much force. If they prevail it is obvious that the clause is, with reference to appeals to the Privy Council, inoperative, and that there has been neither restriction nor regulation of such appeals .... The tone of the correspondence indicates that while restriction and regulation within certain limits will not be objected to, absolute restriction or destruction of the appeal will not be agreed to ....
It cannot be denied that the prerogative to be interfered with is an ancient and important one and that legislation upon it, granting the constitutional power of Parliament to legislate, comes more fairly within the purview of the revision of the Imperial authorities than would mere domestic legislation? Mills tried to remove these doubts by belittling the prerogative and stressing the constitutional right of Canada to full self-government. But Blake was not convinced by him. "I still think", he writes on May 17, "that there is something to be said for the right to dismiss this on Imperial grounds; but the interests involved are so largely Canadian that I think our wishes should prevail. This leads of course to your view, but I must add that I think the saving of the prerogative [in clause 47] has both weakened the argument and lessened the value of the clause for which we are to fight down almost to nothing. I daresay the result may be that, so far as my own discussion goes, it will own impression is that their secret and perhaps unrecognised impression is that things must drift as long as they will, that the drift can only be one way, and that there is no use or object in attempting to form a plan to meet the urgency of the situation. However hardly anyone has spoken to me on the subject and I may be quite wrong. "2ø His first interview, with Herbert, on the Supreme Court Act was on June 17. "I did not much like his telling me that he expected the Supreme Court matter would be almost entirely with the Chancellor, for as you know it is the Chancellor who has been the chief difficulty. "27 With Lord Carnarvon he was not able to discuss the subject until June 27 when he had an hour to expound his views, followed by three-quarters of an hour next day. Carnarvon was sympathetic, admitted that some of the expressions in the council office paper were unhappy, and acknowledged that Canadians were quite able to dispose of their law cases themselves, but said that the only difficulty was that of sentiment on the part of those who looked upon the appeal as a link of imperial union? Blake submitted to him the data he had prepared on the costs and delays involved in the appeal processY 9 Carnarvon undertook to 25Ibid., VI. 26Ibid., VII.
•7Ibid., VI.
•6Ibid., Blake to Mackenzie, June 9.8. •Ibid., Blake to Carnarvon, June 9.0. This letter is printed in the collection, Blake papers, 105: 8.
arrange for an interview between Blake and Cairns; and this, the critical occasion in Blake's mission so far as the supreme court question was concerned, took place on July 5. Blake's long account of it in his letter to Mackenzie is printed elsewhere in this issue. sø After the interview with Cairns, Blake had to wait patiently, or rather impatiently, until he should be informed as to the British government's conclusions. He saw Carnarvon again on July 12 and learned that Cairns thought a solution could be reached. s! This solution Cairns embodied in a memorandum which, by arrangement, he sent to Carnarvon to be read by Blake and which reached Blake on July 17. The memorandum was drafted in the form of a despatch which Carnarvon might send officially to the Canadian government. Its main points were that, on the ground that clause 47 did not affect the appeal to the queen in council, the act could be left to its operation, but that at the same time the British authorities considered it advisable for the Canadian government to take steps to regulate the appeal so as to prevent abuse of it.
Blake had been trying hard to persuade Cairns and Carnarvon not to raise the subject of regulation. If the subject were thus .officially drawn to the attention of the Canadian government, the whole question as to whether the appeal should be abolished rather than regulated would be in a sense unfavourably prejudged; and he wanted the hands of the Canadian government left perfectly free if they should decide in due course to proceed to abolition rather than regulation. He suggested to Carnarvon various changes in phraseology which would at least soften down any reference to regulation in the despatch. These suggestions Carnarvon passed on to Cairns who accepted most of them. Blake then pressed that, if they were determined to mention regulationi two despatches should be sent. One, a public one, should be very short and should merely announce that the imperial authorities had decided to leave the Supreme Court Act to its operation. The other, which should contain their reasons for allowing clause 47 to stand and their suggestions as to future regulation of the appeal, should be a secret one for the eyes of the Canadian government alone. To this they agreed, and in due course, after Blake had sailed for Canada, on August 29, the two despatches were sent aøSee p. 292. 8•After this interview, to make everythingclear, Blake set down his main points in a long private letter to Lord Carnarvon. This letter, dated July 12, contains the same conclusions as he had presented to Cairns a week before (Blake letter book, VI). from Downing street. When Blake came to draft his public report on his mission, the only reference he found it necessary to make to the supreme court question that had taken up so much of his time and energy was a very brief one: "1. SUPR•.M•. CouRT ACT. It was chiefly on this question that a conference was desired by Lord Carnarvon, with whom, as also with the Lord Chancellor, the undersigned fully discussed the measure. Eventually Lord Carnarvon informed the undersigned that Her Majesty's Government had decided that the Act should be left to its operation. "32
As compared with the unpleasant imperial intervention which the Mackenzie government had feared during the late months of 1875, this was a fairly satisfactory result. The Supreme Court Act was saved without amendment or promise of amendment, and the prestige of the Mackenzie government was thereby enhanced. But the victory, as Blake had foreseen before he went to England, was a somewhat hollow one. For he had induced the imperial authorities to take no public action on the act only because he had agreed with them that, with or without clause 47, the act left the appeal to the privy council exactly as it had been. The real question, from the point of view of Blake a6The argument which Mr. Keith has frequently stressed, to the effect that the appeal to the privy council was put upon a statutory basis by the Judicial Committee Acts of 1833 and 1844, and that, therefore, under the Colonial Laws Validity Act, any colonial act abolishing the appeal was void, was accepted by the privy council in the Nadan case. In the discussions of 1875-6 it seems to play little part; those individuals who mention it do not seem to stress it or to realize its full significance. Blake, who had the texts of the 1833 and 1844 acts before him, apparently did not think that they could be read in this way. His argument was that colonial legislatures had'repeatedly prohibited certain appeals (involving cases where the claims at issue were below a certain value), that the assent of the crown had been given to these bills, and that the imperial authorities had not disallowed them. If colonial legislatures had by such long usage the power to abolish certain appeals they must be understood to have the power to abolish all appeals. not from Blake's successor as minister of justice in a Liberal government, but from a private member of parliament in the Conservative opposition. 
